Religion & Ecotheology: Climate Change 

Generally, Religion and eco-theology intersect to explore how spiritual beliefs and practices influence humanity’s relationship with the environment. Ecotheology examines religious teachings and traditions in the context of ecological concerns, emphasizing the sacredness of nature and the moral imperative to protect it. This field of study addresses how different faiths interpret environmental stewardship, human responsibility, and the interconnectedness of all life. Ecotheology seeks to inspire sustainable living practices and ethical responses to environmental crises by integrating theological insights with ecological awareness, advocating for a harmonious relationship between humanity and the natural world.

On the other hand, Religion and Ecotheology: Climate Change focuses on how religious beliefs shape responses to the global climate crisis. This field examines how various faith traditions interpret climate change’s moral and spiritual dimensions, urging followers to take action to mitigate its effects. Ecotheology links the degradation of the environment with ethical teachings, calling for a reevaluation of humanity’s role as stewards of the Earth. By addressing the spiritual implications of climate change, this approach encourages a more profound commitment to environmental justice, sustainability, and protecting vulnerable communities and ecosystems.

Climate change is another environmental concern that has surfaced in the last couple of decades. Environmental change has different destructive impacts that include, but are not limited to, the melting of polar ice, changes in seasons, new sicknesses, and changes in the general climate. Climate change is related to destructive human activities, e.g., gas flaring or tree cutting.

The result is climate change, farmland and fishing grounds loss, and desertification. Climate change puts our homes at risk, the reduction of biodiversity results in the loss of potential medicines, and the eradication of wilderness means we lose a source of awe and beauty. An anthropocentric ethic claims we must respect the environment for human well-being and prosperity. Despite their human-centeredness, anthropocentric environmental ethics have nevertheless played a part in extending moral standing.

This extension has not been to the non-human natural world but to human beings who still need to exist. The granting of moral standing to future generations has been considered necessary because many environmental problems, such as climate change and resource depletion, will affect future humans much more than they affect present ones. Moreover, it is evident that the actions and policies contemporary humans undertake will significantly impact the well-being of future individuals. In light of these facts, some philosophers have founded their environmental ethics on obligations to future generations (Gewirth, 2001).

Indeed, some philosophers have denied such standing to future people, claiming that they lie outside of our moral community because they cannot act reciprocally (Golding, 1972). So, while we can act to benefit them, they can give us nothing in return. This lack of reciprocity, so the argument goes, denies future people moral status. However, other philosophers have pointed out that it is usually considered uncontroversial that we have obligations to the dead, such as executing their wills and so on, even though they cannot reciprocate (Kavka, 1978).

Still, others have conceded that although any future generation cannot do anything for us, it can act for the benefit of its subsequent generations, thus pointing to a broader trans-generational reciprocity (Gewirth, 2001). This argument is not based on the simple fact that future people still need to exist but on the fact that we do not know who they will be. Derek Parfit has called this the “non-identity problem” (Parfit, 1984, ch. 16). The heart of this problem lies in the fact that the policies adopted by states directly affect the movement, education, employment, and so on of their citizens.

Thus, such policies affect who meets whom and has children with whom. So, one set of policies will lead to one group of future people, while another set will lead to a different group. Our actions impact what will exist in the future, making our knowledge of who they will be incomprehensible. Since there is no definitive set of future people to receive the benefits or costs of our actions, to whom do we grant moral standing? Secondly, and particularly important for environmental ethics, how could any future people legitimately complain that our environmentally destructive policies have wronged them?

In response to the non-identity problem, it has been argued that while we do not know precisely who will exist in the future, we do know that some groups of people will exist and that they will have interests. Perhaps our obligations lie with these interests rather than the future individuals themselves (Desjardins, 2001, p. 74). As for the second aspect of the problem, we might claim that although future generations will benefit from our environmentally destructive policies by their very existence, they will nevertheless have been harmed. After all, cannot one be harmed by a particular action even if one benefits overall? To illustrate this point, James Woodward gives the example of a racist airline refusing to allow a black man, on a flight that subsequently crashes (Woodward, 1986). Is not this man harmed by the airline, even though he benefits overall?

Even if we decide to grant moral standing to future human beings, that still leaves the problem of deciding what obligations we have to them. One set of difficulties relates to our ignorance of who they are. We lack information about the identity of future people, and we have neither knowledge of their conceptions of a good life nor what technological advances they may have made. For example, why bother preserving rare species of animal or oil reserves if humans in the future receive no satisfaction from the diversity of life and have developed some alternative fuel source?

Our ignorance of such matters makes it very difficult to flesh out the content of our obligations. By way of reply to such problems, some philosophers have argued that while we do not know everything about future people, we can make some reasonable assumptions. For example, Brian Barry has argued that to pursue their idea of the good life – whatever that happens to be – future people will need some essential resources, such as food, water, minimum health, and so on (Barry, 1999). Barry thus argues that our obligations lie in ensuring we do not prevent future generations from meeting their basic needs. This, in turn, forces us to consider and appropriately revise our pollution levels, resource depletion, climate change, and population growth.

While this might seem a rather conservative ethic to some, it is worth pointing out that at no time in humanity’s history have met the needs of contemporaries, let alone those of future people. This unfortunate fact points to a further problem that all future-oriented anthropocentric environmental ethics must face. How can the needs and interests of the current generation be weighed against those of those human beings in the future? Can we justifiably let present people go without for the sake of future humans? The problems posed by a minimal extension of moral standing are real and complex. Despite this, however, most environmental philosophers feel that such anthropocentric ethics do not go far enough and want to extend moral standing beyond humanity.

Only by doing this, such thinkers argue, can we get beyond humans’ narrow and selfish interests and treat the environment and its inhabitants with the respect they deserve. The Kyoto Protocol is the first genuine global attempt to deal with the problem of climate change. However, without the participation of so many large polluters, with the agreed reductions in greenhouse gas emissions so small, and with many countries looking like they may well miss their targets, many commentators already regard it as a failure.

Ethicists need to respond not just by castigating those they blame for the failure. Instead, they must propose alternatives and better means of resolving our problems. For example, is it more critical to outline a scheme of obligations for individuals rather than states and go for a bottom-up solution to these problems? Alternatively, businesses should take the lead in tackling these problems. Indeed, it is in the interests of big business to be active in this way, given the power of consumers. We will likely see business ethics address many of the same issues that environmental ethics has been tackling.

Take global distributive justice as an example: if one considers how climate change will affect people throughout the world so differently – affecting individuals’ homes, sanitation, disease resistance, ability to earn a living, and so on – it is clear that consideration of the environment is essential to such questions of justice. Part of the job of the environmental ethicist will thus be to give such disciplines the benefit of their expertise.

How can the destruction of the atmosphere be reduced/halted by the involvement of religious leaders? Role-model, leading by example, Creating awareness for the environment, Right interpretation of Scripture Constituents of Environmental Problems; Ignorance, Poverty, Urbanization, Overpopulation, Deforestation, Pollution, and so forth

Next blog will discuss Problems of Climate Change.